中国的“马六甲困境”和中国人民解放军的未来

Written by Malcolm Davis.

马克姆.戴维斯

The life-blood of China’s economy is energy. Without access to energy resources, China’s economy will slow, and its prosperity will wane, it will become more vulnerable to internal social and political disorder and the CCP’s grip on power will weaken.[1] Therefore, ensuring China’s energy security affects its foreign and defence policy, and will influence the future development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).[2] China’s imported oil demand continues to outstrip diminishing domestic and offshore production and current projections suggest that by 2020 imported oil will make up 66% of its total oil demand, increasing to 72% by 2040.

At the heart of the challenge of ensuring energy security is ‘the Malacca Dilemma’. Chinese President Hu Jintao recognised the strategic significance of the Malacca Dilemma in November 2003 noting that “certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca] Strait.” [3] The significance of the Malacca Strait is that 80% of China’s energy (in addition to much of its trade) moves through a waterway that at its narrowest point is only 1.7 miles across. The nearby Lombok-Makassar Straits (see map) are also strategically significant as most supertankers too large for the Malacca Strait traverse this route. [4] China is attempting to alleviate its dependency on these waterways by building pipelines through Myanmar and via Gwadar in Pakistan, but none of these projects would replace dependence on the sea for China’s energy supplies.[5]

中国经济的生命线是能源。若不能获得能源资源，中国的经济就会放缓，繁荣不再，继而更容易受到内部社会和政治混乱的影响，共产党紧握的权利将消弱。于是，保证中国经济安全影响其外交和国防政策，并影响到中国解放军的未来发展。中国进口石油需求量持续超过日益缩减的国内和近海油田产量。根据目前的预测，到2020年进口石油将达到石油总需求的66%，到2040年则是72%。

确保能源安全的挑战核心是“马六甲困境”。中国主席胡锦涛认识到马六甲困境的战略意义，在2003年11月指出“某些大国一直侵占试图控制通过（马六甲）海峡的航运。”马六甲海峡的意义在于80%的中国能源（除了大部分的贸易）都要经过这道最窄处仅1.7公里的水道。附近的Lombok-Makassar海峡（见地图）也意义重大，因为大多数超大型邮轮太大而不能通过马六甲海峡。中国试图通过修建通过缅甸全境和巴基斯坦巴达尔的管道来缓减对这些水道的依赖，但是这些工程都不能取代中国能源对大海的依赖。

Therefore in considering solutions to resolving the Malacca Dilemma, an obvious step, and one currently being undertaken, is greater cooperative naval diplomacy with other international actors to maintain good order at sea, and counter unconventional non-state threats to maritime security such as piracy and maritime terrorism. Beijing also could support capacity building for littoral states, intelligence exchanges and multi-national training through regional security architecture such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). But such peacetime practices do nothing to eliminate the Malacca Dilemma given that in a future conflict China still faces the prospect that an adversary could interdict Chinese shipping passing through the Malacca and Lombok-Makassar Straits.

因此考虑一种方案去解决马六甲困境，是很明显的一步，现在也在进行中。其主要是通过合作的海军外交方式与其他国际力量维持良好的海洋规则。并且对抗非传统非国家威胁维护海上安全，如海盗 和海上恐怖主义。北京也在扶持发展一些沿海国家建设能力，情报交换和多国训练 来维护区域安全，如 东盟地区论坛。但和平时期的练习无助于改善 马六甲困境  在未来的冲突中 中国依然面临着 其对手禁止中国驶过马六甲 和 龙目岛-望加锡海峡 的困境。

In a recent debate over the effectiveness of the US ‘AirSea Battle’ concept, Thomas Hammes suggested a strategy of Offshore Control that proposes a distant blockade on China and notes that the United States “…could prevent the passage of large cargo ships and tankers. In doing so, it would cripple China’s export trade, which is essential to China’s economy.” [6] The strategy highlights the importance of the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda straits, and ensuring routes north and south of Australia were controlled such that “these shipments could be cut off”.[7]

在最近的关于 美国“海空一体战 ”覆盖率的讨论中，托马斯.海默思提议了一种离岸控制 计划远距离封锁中国，美国的记录如下“。。可以阻止大的货船和油轮通过，通过这种方式可以削弱中国的出口贸易，这对中国经济的影响至关重要”。战略重点是马六甲，龙目岛和巽他海峡的重要性，确保澳大利亚南北的通道处于掌控之中，这样中国的“货运会被切断”。

The context of this debate over US strategy is important to consider. China’s rapid rise and its military modernisation has generated a regional security dilemma with its neighbours who see China’s assertive behaviour in managing Asian maritime disputes, and worry that under Xi Jinping, China has chosen to move beyond Deng’s ‘bide your time, hide your strength’ dictum of foreign policy to embrace a more assertive revisionist posture that challenges the existing regional order and the strategic primacy of the United States. Regional states have responded by seeking closer security ties with the United States at the same time as the United States has chosen to rebalance to Asia in response to China’s rise. Thus, a regional ‘pull’ combined with a US’ ‘push’ is emerging. From Beijing’s perspective, the US rebalance, and intra-regional ‘band wagoning’ is indicative of the containment of China, and it has chosen to push back militarily with A2AD. The US and its allies see such a Chinese step as reinforcing their perception of a desire by China to challenge US strategic primacy in Asia. The regional security dilemma is sharpened.

（前段）这篇有关美国战略的论文需要慎重看待。中国经济的快速增长及其本身的军事现代化已经引发了中国与那些感受中国在处理亚太海事问题上越来越呈现强硬姿态的邻国的局部安全争端,并且它们（邻国）担心，在习近平主席的领导下，中国逐渐改变原来邓小平制定的韬光养晦的对外处理政策，而采用更加自信的修正主义姿态，而这些会挑战原先美国所设定的亚太地区态势和相应的策略。作为回应（中国）周边国家加强了与美国的安保合作关系，与此同时美国也决定重返亚太以制衡中国的崛起。因此一场背后有美国加油的地区拉锯站已经开始。在北京开来，美国的重返亚太以及内地里的拉帮结派都是在遏制中国，并且它已经去部署军事力量执行反介入行动。美国以及它的盟友们已经把中国的近来行为看作挑战原有美国塑造的亚太秩序的征兆，亚太地区的安全局势将会越来越糟糕。

For China, Hammes’ Offshore Control represents the Malacca Dilemma made manifest. In thinking about how China may respond, Storey argues that one path to countering the Malacca Dilemma is “building credible naval forces capable of securing China’s SLOCs.”[8] But what does this really imply for future PLA modernisation? China will need to build credible expeditionary naval capabilities as well as long-range airpower for maritime strike operations in more distant operations in ‘Far Seas’ and ‘Far Oceans’ to ensure an ability to break any distant blockade (see map). China’s introduction of the training aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012, is to be followed by up to four more indigenous aircraft carriers potentially by the mid-2020s, and represents a step in the direction of blue water capabilities designed for such a role.[9] But aircraft carriers will need to be fully supported by naval surface combatants as well as appropriate auxiliary vessels designed for at-sea combat sustainment tasks. It is beginning to develop skills in operating naval task forces in more distant operations, such as those engaged on counter-piracy tasks off the Gulf of Aden, but its logistic capabilities are insufficient to sustain a distant task force, especially one engaged in hypothetically high intensity combat operations. Erickson argues, based on analysis by Nan Li, that by 2020 China will only be able to project a modest joint task force for low-intensity operations far from China.[10]

对于中国来说，Hammes的离岸控制清楚的反应了马六甲困局。对于中国可能的反应，Storey认为一种能解决马六甲困局的方法是“建立可靠地海洋力量以保护中国的海上运输线”。[8] 但是这对于解放军未来的现代化意味着什么？中国会需要建立可靠的远洋力量，以及远程的制空权已完成在“远海”、“远洋”上的海上打击行动，从而保证打破发生在远离本土区域的封锁（见地图）。中国在2012年9月开始训练辽宁号航母，并且可能在2025年左右完成建造多达4个本土航母。这是增强蓝水力量，打破马六甲困局的一步。[9]但是航母需要其它水面舰只，辅助舰只的协助才能完成任务。中国海军已经开始在远洋执行任务并积累经验，例如他们在亚丁湾执行了打击海盗的任务。但是中国海军的后勤依然不足以支撑越洋任务，尤其是假想的高强度对抗。Erickson认为根据Li Nan的分析，到2020年中国在远离本土的地方只能执行低强度的小型联合任务。[10]

Yet, maintaining China’s energy security in wartime cannot be seen as being of secondary importance, and China is now undertaking a series of political and strategic steps, and building new military capabilities that suggest it is beginning to respond to the threat of distant blockades. At the political and strategic level, President Xi Jinping has recently announced the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ to integrate markets from China to Europe via the Indian Ocean littoral region. The Maritime Silk Road will enable China to develop maritime infrastructure including ports across the region. The Maritime Silk Road strengthens China’s economic and political influence, and thus widens China’s strategic interests across the Indian Ocean. This will not represent a new development per se, as Holmes and Yoshihara note that China has been active in promoting its influence across the Indian Ocean littoral over recent years.[11] But the stakes are now rising. China’s growing investment and its international prestige associated with the Maritime Silk Road must be protected which will in turn demand presence. That must influence PLA modernisation in coming years, and the Maritime Silk Road now provides a key rationale for an expansion of the PLA’s expeditionary warfare capabilities.

然而保证中国战时能源安全无疑是最关键的，中国正在采取一系列政治和战略手段来增加新的军事能力，中国已经开始着手应对远洋封锁的威胁。在政治和战略方面，习近平主席最近宣布要开辟海上丝绸之路，力求同过印度洋沿海区域打通通向欧洲的市场。海上丝绸之路的建设将带动此区域内港口及其它海上基础设施的建设，从而增强中国经济和政治影响力，并扩大中国印度洋区域的战略利益。然而海上丝绸之路自身并不代表新的发展需求，如Holmes 和Yoshihara所说的，中国近年来正在积极提升其在印度洋周边的影响力，但是带来的风险也越来越大。由丝绸之路带来的日益增长的投资和国际影响势必会需要加强对应的军事存在，中国解放军便会以此为借口在未来几年加快其现代化进程扩张远洋军事实力。 

At the military level, Erickson suggests a number of potential indicators for emerging blue water and long-range air capabilities, and three specific capabilities are worthy of consideration.[12] Erickson nominates quieter submarines as being important, and O’Rourke notes that the PLAN’s relatively noisy Shang class nuclear submarines (SSNs) are to be replaced with the quieter and more sophisticated Type 095 guided-missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs).[13] Significantly, China has begun operating its existing submarines in the Indian Ocean, much to the concern of India. Erickson also notes that more advanced surface vessels would be a key indicator. The PLAN is deploying the sophisticated Type 052D Luyang III guided missile destroyer (DDG), but is developing an even more capable Type 055 Cruiser, designed to protect aircraft carriers as part of a battle group and with the first potentially commissioned by 2017. 

在军事方面，Erickson建议增加对海上和空中的监视，可以考虑增加下面三种战斗能，

先是无声潜艇，O’Rourke指出用更安静和精密的095型导弹核潜艇（SSGNs）取代解放军现役的商级核潜艇（SSNs）。值得注意的是中国在印度洋布置的潜艇已经让印度极为不安。再次，Erickson指出，解放军将采用更先进的水面舰艇展开巡逻。他们将配置先进的052型旅洋III导弹驱逐舰，但是一种性能更加出色的055型巡洋舰正在开发之中。新的巡洋舰将预计在2017年下水未来的任务便是加入航母编队保护航母。

Finally Erickson notes the importance of long-range air power. China is developing a new stealthy long-range bomber known as the H-20 which is designed to “allow the Chinese air force to complement aircraft carrier and amphibious projection capabilities of the [PLAN]” in conjunction with long-range J-20 stealth fighters. More significant is the role of PLASAF’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) capability. The DF-21D ASBM has generated concern in regards to its ability to undertake A2AD against US and allied forces within the First Island chain, but future longer range systems could extend A2AD south towards the Malacca and Lombok-Makassar Straits. Mark Stokes suggests that a follow-on capability to the DF-21D would extend PLASAF’s reach against adversary naval capabilities out to 3,000 km.[14] Such a capability, cued by ocean surveillance satellites, would enable China to strike at naval vessels from Hainan Island to well south of the Malacca Strait and just north of the Lombok Strait. 

最后一点，Erickson指出要加远程空中作战能力，中国正在研发一种代号为H-20的新型远程隐形轰战机，可以和J-20远程隐形战斗机协同作战，使空军可以更好地补充航母和解放军两栖投送能力。更需要注意的是中国解放军空军配备的反舰弹道导弹（ASBM），其中的东风DF-21型反弹道导弹凭借其可以对第一岛链范围内美军及其盟军实施反介入/区域拒止(A2AD)作战引起人们的极大关注，但是将来的远程系统将会使这种作战方式向南扩展到龙目岛和孟加锡 Mark Stokes认为DF-21D未来可能使解放军空军应对作战范围在3000公里的敌对海军，加上海洋监视卫星的引导，中国有能力打击从海南岛以南到马六甲海峡至龙目海峡以北任何军舰。

In conclusion, the essential requirement to ensure China’s energy security, and the prestige invested in building the Maritime Silk Road argues for China to begin building the means to protect its interests. From Beijing’s perspective, it cannot merely focus on countering intervention in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, or as a result of maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The task of ensuring China’s maritime trade and energy security, and countering the risk of a distant blockade is emerging as an important strategic interest that must shape the PLA’s future to a greater degree. As has happened before, China may yet surprise us as its military modernisation surges ahead to meet new challenges.

最终，对保障中国的能源安全的重大需求以及想要建立海上丝绸之路的野心，这些促使中国去构建强大军力去保护自己的利益。在北京看来，这支力量不能仅仅着眼于摆平台海争端的外来干预，也不只为压制东海和南海的海事纠纷，它的任务应该是保障中国在全球的海上贸易和能源安全，对抗远程封锁的风险。这种重大的战略利益迫使解放军去追求更强的军力。如同以前发生的那样，中国会用令我们惊讶的军事现代化进程去迎接挑战       

Dr. Malcolm Davis is an Assistant Professor and Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in China-Western relations at Bond University, Queensland, Australia. He is finishing up a book for Routledge UK on Chinese military modernisation in the 21st Century. Image credit: CC by Naval Surface Warriors/Flickr.

作者Malcolm Davis博士是位于澳大利亚昆士兰的邦德大学的助教及博士后研究院对中西关系的研究机构的一员，他刚刚在Routledge UK刊发了一本对中国在21世纪的军事现代化的论著//（页码XXXXXXX）图片由Naval Surface Warriors和Flickr.等提供